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STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN C. DANA, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
BRUCE C. DANA, 
Defendants/Respondent. 
1 BRIEF OF 
i CASE NO: 
1 CATEGORY 
RESPONDENT 
880382-CA 
14b 
Appeal of a Decree of Divorce from the 
First Judicial District Court in and for 
Cache County, State of Utah 
THE HONORABLE JOHN F. WAHLQUIST, Presiding 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The parties were divorced on January 13, 1983, after a 
contested hearing before the Honorable Judge Omer J. Call. 
At the time of the divorce the Respondent had three (3) 
children from a previous marriage and the Appellant and 
Respondent had three (3) children during their marriage. 
(Transcript p. 3, lines 22 - 25; p. 4, lines 1 - 3, 18 - 25; 
p. 5, lines 1-5.) 
The Appellant previous to her marriage was employed 
with the Civil Service with a GS rating of 5, and upon the 
marriage, quit her job, withdrew her retirement and used the 
money in the marriage and did not work outside the home for 
the eight (8) years between marriage and divorce, but became 
employed after the divorce and is currently making between 
$17,000.00 and $18,000.00 a year. (Transcript p. 3, lines 
14 - 16; p. 15, lines 5 - 25; p. 79, lines 16 - 19.) 
At the time of the divorce there was no visitation 
schedule and support was set by the Court in the original 
divorce of $165.00 per month per child. (Transcript p. 5, 
lines 13 - 20; p. 20, lines 16 - 19; p. 21, lines 12 - 14; 
p. 73, lines 8 - 24.) 
On November 6, 1986, the Appellant filed a Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce requiring visitation of the 
Respondent with the children on a set visitation schedule or 
to have the child support increased to make up for the 
alleged benefits lost to the children because of an alleged 
lack of regular visitation with the father and other family. 
(See Record pp. 124 - 127.) 
On December 11, 1986, the Respondent filed an Answer 
and Counter-Petition to Modify the Decree of Divorce alleg-
ing that due to distances involved and other factors, the 
Respondent was unable to arrange for visitation on an 
alternate weekend basis and further requested that the Court 
reduce the Defendant's child support payments during the one 
(1) month period of summer visitation, that overall child 
support payments be reduced to do Plaintiff's substantial 
increase in income and Defendant's increase in obligations 
and that the Respondent be awarded visitation as prayed for 
in his Counter-Petition. (See Record, pp. 129 - 132.) 
The Respondent has changed employers several times 
since the original Decree of Divorce and his income has gone 
from $21,000.00 to $32,000.00 a year, but during that time 
the Respondent was also remarried, adopting the child of his 
third wife and another child has been born to the parties. 
(Transcript p. 49, lines 7 - 8; p. 73, lines 4 - 15; p. 76, 
lines 16 - 21; p. 74, lines 12 - 17; p. 75, lines 2 - 8.) 
Respondent testified that he had attempted more visits 
than acknowledged by the Appellant and made several mentions 
to a diary that he kept outlining the visits he made with 
the children. The Respondent did not visit more because of 
the hostility created by the Plaintiff and the children 
towards him, which hostility was repeatedly mentioned in the 
Findings of the trial Judge. (Transcript p. 65 - 66; p. 62, 
lines 12 - 13; p. 62, lines 23 - 25; p. 71, lines 18 - 24; 
p. 94, lines 1 - 4; p. 97, lines 16 - 18.) 
A trial was held on the Petitions for Modification of 
the Decree of Divorce on December 29, 1987, before the 
Honorable John F. Wahlquist, Judge Presiding, where Judge 
Wahlquist entered an Order from the bench wherein he en-
couraged visitation and set specific visitation of every 
other Friday starting with the first Friday in January at 
6:00 until Sunday at 6:00, with the total month of July, and 
on Christmas he would pick the children up at 2:00 and keep 
them for four (4) days and then they must be returned. The 
Court did not make adjustments for normal Father's Day or 
Mother !s Day, or anything of that type because of the 
Finding of the inability of the parties to communicate. The 
Court further held from the bench that there was no way the 
Court could force the Respondent to visit with his children 
except that the Respondent must call the children three (3) 
days ahead of time if he's not coming so that the children 
would know that he was not coming. The trial Judge further 
held that the Respondent has got to think about the fact 
that even though he's got to go through the wrath of hell 
sometimes to get to the kids, he ought to go for these three 
(3) kids. (Transcript p. 95 & 96.) 
The Trial Court found there was a substantial change in 
circumstances in regards to the parties as found in the 
trial record, that the situation since the time of the 
divorce has grossly changed. The Appellant's income is 
greater and the emergency of the situation is no longer 
present and the parties should so be treated. (Transcript 
p. 95, lines 4 - 6.) The Court further found that the 
Respondent does have eight (8) children and that all new 
children have to face one thing, that is when the new 
brothers and sisters arrive you have to share with them and 
that that is the only way the law can handle the situation, 
and that the Court is not sure at all that there won't be 
more children as constituting a further substantial change 
in circumstances. (Transcript p. 95, lines 17 - 21.) The 
trial Judge entered a new Order basing child support on the 
Uniform Child Support Schedule and allowing all eight (8) 
children to count as part of the application of that Sched-
ule, and further ordered that the Appellant be granted the 
three (3) children of this parties1 marriage for income tax 
deduction purposes unless they agreed otherwise. (Order 
Modifying Decree of Divorce) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court findings should not be disturbed 
or reversed in a divorce case in equity unless this Court 
finds that there has been a clear abuse of discretion 
exercised by the Trial Court. 
2. The Trial Court was not under an obligation based 
on statutory and case law to award to the Appellant addi-
tional child support compensation even if there was, con-
trary to their record, an irregularity in visitation by the 
non-custodial parent. 
3. The Trial Court did find in open Court that there 
was a substantial change in circumstances allowing the 
modification of the Decree and the subsequent Order decreas-
ing the previous child support Order. 
4. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in 
considering two after born children in making a determina-
tion that the previous child support award should be de-
creased because the Respondent now had eight (8) children 
for which he was legally obligated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE APPELLATE COURT WILL NOT DISTURB THE 
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT UNLESS THERE 
IS A CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN A 
DIVORCE CASE IN EQUITY. 
The Appellate Court in reviewing matters in equity and 
more specifically, in a divorce case, will refrain from 
disturbing the findings of the Trial Court unless a clear 
abuse of discretion by the Trial Court is shown. 
The standard for reviewing matters in equity was 
recently considered by the Utah Supreme Court in J & M 
Construction, Inc., v. Southam, 722 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986), 
wherein the Court held as follows: 
In reviewing matters in equity, this 
Court will reverse the Trial Court only 
(emphasis added) when the evidence 
clearly preponderates against the 
findings below. Although we may review 
that evidence, we are particularly 
mindful of the advantage position of the 
Trial Court to hear, weigh, and evaluate 
the testimony of the parties. (Cites 
omitted) Where the evidence may be in 
conflict, this Court will not upset the 
findings below unless the evidence so 
clearly preponderates against them that 
this Court is convinced that a manifest 
injustice has been done... 
The Utah Supreme Court in regards to a modification of 
the Decree of Divorce and an Appellate Court standards for 
reviewing those matters held in Christensen v. Christensen, 
628 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1981) as follows: 
The modification of divorce decrees is a 
matter of equity, and it is the duty and 
prerogative of this Court to review both 
the facts and the law. (cites omitted) 
However, it is likewise true that on 
review this Court will accord consider-
able deference to the judgment of the 
Trial Court due to its advantage posi-
tion and will not disturb the action of 
that Court unless the evidence clearly 
preponderates to the contrary, or the 
Trial Court abused its discretion or 
misapplies principals of law. (cites 
omitted) 
This Court in the recent decision of Boyle v. Boyle, 
735 P.2d 669 (Utah App. 1987) held as follows: 
This Court will refrain from disturbing 
findings of the Trial Court in a divorce 
action unless a clear abuse of dis-
cretion is shown. (Cite omitted) The 
Trial Court is clearly in the best 
position to weigh the evidence, deter-
mine credibility and arrive at factual 
conclusions. 
Accordingly, pursuant to case law, unless this Court 
finds a clear abuse of discretion in this equity or divorce 
matter, it should not disturb the findings of the Trial 
Court which stands in a better position to weigh the evi-
dence, determine credibility and to arrive at factual 
conclusions. 
POINT II, 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN NOT ALLOWING ADDITIONAL 
COMPENSATION IN THE FORM OF CHILD 
SUPPORT IN THE REGULAR VISITATION OF THE 
NON-CUSTODIAL PARENT. 
Trial Courts have continuing jurisdiction to consider 
motions to modify dealing with child custody and visitation 
rights. The appropriate award is within the Trial Court!s 
discretion and is to be reversed only upon abuse of that 
discretion. See Kallas v. Kallas, 614 P.2d 641 (Utah 1980) 
which was cited by the Appellant. 
In the immediate case at hand, the Respondent fully 
recognizes as cited by the Appellant that "a Court must come 
in a custody dispute, give the highest priority to the 
welfare of the children over the desires of either parent", 
Id. p. 645, and further that, " a child custody proceeding 
is equitable in nature and must be based primarily and 
foremost on the welfare and interest of the minor children.11 
Id, p. 645, "and that the same general principals apply in 
determining visitation rights.11 Id. p. 645. 
But, in Kallas v. Kallas, the Utah Supreme Court was 
dealing with the case of a non-custodial parentfs visitation 
rights concerning her request for overnight visitation when 
she was an acknowledged lesbian. Those facts were unknown 
to the custodial parent prior to the original entry of the 
Decree of Divorce even though the non-custodial parent 
engaged in those practices. The Supreme Court found in that 
case that the Trial Court needed to consider pertinent facts 
that were not determined concerning the sexuality of the 
non-custodial parent to make an appropriate determination as 
to overnight visitation privileges and that the Court should 
base their decision for overnight visitation on all relevant 
evidence as to the children's present and future well-being. 
Id. pp. 645 - 646. Nowhere in Kallas v. Kallas, does the 
Utah Supreme Court even address the issue as to whether or 
not the non-custodial parent's failure to exercise regular 
visitation should result in compensation in lieu of that 
visitation. 
The Appellant cites this Honorable Court to the Utah 
Supreme Court case of Race v. Race, 740 P. 2d 253 (Utah 
1987) , in its consideration of child support and child 
visitation. The Utah Supreme Court did hold in that case 
that "although the awarding of visitation and child support 
is within the Court's discretion, the Court must consider 
the child's paramount right to and need for his parent's 
support." The Utah Supreme Court went on to further hold as 
follows: 
. . . court ordered child support is an 
obligation imposed for the benefit of 
the children, not the divorcing spouse. 
We find no circumstances here which 
justify the trial court in deferring 
support until visitation between the 
children and their father could be 
worked out. In the interim, they needed 
and were entitled to his support. 
The Utah Supreme Court specifically found in Race v. 
Race, that child support and child visitation were not in-
ter-related, that in that case specifically, the custodial 
parent was entitled to child support whether or not visita-
tion was being exercised or worked out. The Utah Supreme 
Court did not hold that the custodial parent was entitled to 
additional compensation or child support, but rather the 
Court held that even if visitation were not worked out the 
custodial parent was entitled to regular and appropriate 
child support, which in this case, was done. 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-45-3 and § 78-45-4, and the 
Utah Supreme Court case of Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P. 2d 
393 (Utah 1985) fully supports the opinion cited to in Race 
v. Race. Neither those cited statutes nor Woodward make any 
mention of the custodial parent being entitled to additional 
child support should the non-custodial parent not exercise 
regular visitation. 
None of the case law or statutes support Appellant's 
position that should the non-custodial parent fail to 
exercise regular visitation that the custodial parent should 
be compensated by other means or by additional child sup-
port. This is assuming that the non-custodial parent or the 
Respondent in this case has failed to exercise visitation, 
which is not the case, and even if it were the situation, 
again no case law or statutory authority has been cited by 
the Appellant nor is any available, which would allow the 
custodial parent additional compensation for child support 
should the non-custodial parent fail to "regularly" exercise 
visitation. 
In this case, as previously cited in the Statement of 
Facts, the Respondent made several attempts and did actually 
visit with the minor children on several occasions. The 
youngest child, Brooke, became emotionally upset when she 
went to visit her father and there were complications there. 
(See Transcript p. 29) The Respondent also requested 
visitation for the whole summer for the last year and was 
not granted that visitation. (See Transcript p. 31) The 
Respondent has written letters to his children on several 
occasions, (See Transcript p. 37) The Respondent has 
attempted on several occasions to make phone calls to his 
children and was unable to due to an unlisted number and a 
time period when the Appellant was without a phone. (See 
Transcript p. 38) The Respondent also kept a detailed diary 
or journal specifying visits that he had with the minor 
children showing visits of once or twice a month based on 
the Respondent's ability to travel long distances to visit 
with the children. (See Transcript p. 65 - 66) 
The Respondent does not exercise visitation every other 
weekend because of the long distances he has needed to 
travel, the desires of at least one of the children not to 
exercise visitation, and as the trial Judge found, due to 
the hostility of the Appellant and her desire to be the 
"boss" dictating or determining if and when the Respondent 
could exercise visitation. 
The trial Judge did order specific visitation as 
previously spelled out and encouraged the Respondent to 
exercise that visitation. Accordingly due to the fact that 
the Respondent has been timely without failure in paying his 
ordered child support, has exercised visitation to the best 
of his ability under the specific circumstances spelled out 
hereinabove and Appellant's failure to cite any case law or 
statutory authority wherein this Court or the Utah Supreme 
Court have awarded additional child support for failure to 
exercise visitation. The Trial Court did not abuse its 
discretion in ordering the visitation it did and in failing 
to order additional child support by Respondent to the 
Appellant. 
POINT III. 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THERE HAD 
BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUM-
STANCES AND DECREASING PREVIOUS CHILD 
SUPPORT ORDER. 
The Appellant has cited too the cases of Woodward v. 
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393 (Utah 1985); Lea v. Bowers, 658 P.2d 
1213 (Utah 1983); Kessimakis v. Kessimakis, 580 P.2d 1090 
(Utah 1978); and Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 
(Utah 19 81) , to support the premise that in order for a 
moving party to obtain a modification of a Decree of Di-
vorce, the party seeking the modification has the burden to 
show a substantial change of circumstances. The Appellant 
fully agrees and fully recognizes that the moving party does 
have the burden of showing a substantial change of circum-
stances before a modification of a Decree of Divorce can be 
granted. 
Although the Order is admittedly deficient in providing 
the substantial change of circumstances basis in this 
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matter, Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
entitled Findings by the Court, states as follows: 
...in all actions tried upon the facts 
without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the Court shall find the facts specif-
ically and state separately its con-
clusions of law thereon, and judgment 
shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58(A): 
...it will be sufficient if the findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are 
stated orally and recorded in open court 
following the close of the evidence or 
appear in an opinion or memorandum of 
decision filed by the Court... 
The Trial Court found as identified in the Transcript 
that there was a substantial change in circumstances in 
regards to the parties in that the situation since the time 
of the divorce had grossly changed. The Appellant's income 
is greater and the emergency of the situation is no longer 
present, and the Trial Court found that the parties should 
so be treated. (Transcript p. 95, lines 4-6.) The Court 
further found that the Respondent does currently have eight 
(8) children and that all new children have to face one 
thing, that is when the new brothers and sisters arrive you 
have to share with them and that is the only way the law can 
handle the situation, and that the Court is not sure at all 
that there won't be more children as constituting a further 
substantial change in circumstances. (Transcript p. 95, 
lines 17 - 21.) The trial Judge then entered a new Order 
basing child support on the Uniform Child Support Schedule 
and allowed all eight (8) children to count as part of the 
application of that Schedule. The Court further held as 
further allowance to the Appellant, that the Child Support 
Schedule then being used was going to change in July and 
that when that Child Support Schedule changed that the 
Divorce Decree would automatically change along with it. 
(Transcript p. 99, lines 2-6.) 
Although the Uniform Child Support Schedule that was 
used was not admitted as evidence at the time of trial, 
there was specific reference to that Schedule which was 
admitted as evidence showing that should Respondent's income 
vary between $2,795.00 to $2,883.00 gross per month with 
eight (8) children which he was supporting, then his 
obligation would be $94.00 per month per child, which is 
what the Court ordered. (Transcript p. 9 8 & 99.) 
As cited above, the Court recognized that the Appel-
lant's income had increased and that the Respondent's income 
had increased but the Trial Court stated that the emergency 
situation because of these changes had resulted in a sub-
stantial change in circumstances and therefore awarded the 
reduction. The reduction was based not only on the changes 
in income of both parties but also on the fact that the 
Respondent now had a responsibility for eight (8) children 
rather than six (6) due to the subsequent adoption of 
another child and birth of another child to the Respondent, 
and the Court's recognition that there might be further 
changes with additional children. 
The Respondent did testify specifically that due to the 
increase in his financial obligations since the time of the 
divorce along with an increase in his earnings, he was 
feeling essentially the same kind of financial stress before 
the original Divorce Decree and support order as he was at 
the time of this hearing. (Transcript p. 73, lines 8 - 23.) 
The Respondent further testified that the financial stress 
had reached such a point that he was obligated to borrow 
money to meet some of his financial obligations and had 
reached the point of possibly filing bankruptcy, which due 
to the nature of his employment would result in losing his 
job so that the Respondent was unable to file a bankruptcy. 
He needed other avenues to relieve his financial stress, one 
of which included the request for a reduction of payment of 
child support. 
The Trial Court Judge did not abuse his discretion in 
reducing child support due to the fact that although not 
spelled out in the Order, but rather in open Court, the 
trial Judge did find substantial change in circumstances and 
based on those changes did order a reduction in the award of 
child support. 
POINT IV, 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING TWO AFTER BORN 
CHILDREN TO DECREASE THE CHILD SUPPORT 
ORDER. 
As acknowledged by the Appellant after the Appellant's 
and Respondent's divorce, the Respondent married for a third 
time. This third marriage produced a new child and 
obligation for the Respondent, and due to the relationship 
of the parties, the Respondent adopted his new wife's child 
from a previous marriage. 
At the time of the modification hearing, the trial 
Judge did consider all eight (8) children in awarding a 
modification in the Decree of Divorce in regards to child 
support rather than considering only the six (6) children 
that were present at the time of the original Decree in 
reducing the child support. The Respondent had become the 
natural1father of a seventh child and pursuant to proper and 
appropriate adoption laws had in essence become the natural 
father of an eight child. 
The Appellant cites this Honorable Court to the Utah 
Supreme Court case of Kiesel v. Kiesel, 619 P.2d 1374 (Utah 
1980) to support its position that the Trial Court should 
have taken into consideration the third wife's knowledge of 
the situation and her responsibility to help provide for her 
-1 7-
children in this situation. Kiesel recognizes the follow-
ing: 
While it is true that a stranger to a 
divorce action should not be con-
strained, by reason of marriage, to lend 
financial support to his or her spouse's 
children by a prior marriage, the Court 
is not precluded from taking such 
circumstances into consideration in 
determining the ability of one who does 
have the legal obligation of support. 
Evidence was offered by the Respondent that his new 
wife had quit her $8,000.00 a year job to stay home and care 
for the children, but the Court based on its discretion, 
although a finding of fact is lacking in this area, did not 
consider the Respondent's new wife's ability in providing 
support for the minor children. Kiesel v. Kiesel, simply 
indicates that the Court is not precluded from taking such 
circumstances into consideration in determining the ability 
of one who does have the legal obligation of support. The 
Utah Supreme Court does not state there that the Court must 
take those circumstances into consideration. Beyond that, 
evidence was produced showing that the Respondent's new wife 
or third wife was not working at the present time and had 
quit a job that was producing only $8,000.00 a year. 
The Appellant then cites this Court to the Utah Supreme 
Court case of Christensen v. Christensen, 628 P.2d 1297 
(Utah 1981) requesting this Court to find that the Trial 
Court abused its discretion in considering the adopted child 
and new child of the Respondent subsequent to the marriage 
as showing a substantial change in circumstances enough to 
warrant modification of the child support payments. In 
Christensen the Court found as follows: 
Finally, while it JLs possible (emphasis 
added) that the fact that Defendant has 
two children by a second marriage could 
show a change in circumstances substan-
tial enough to warrant modification of 
child support payments, there is no 
evidence in the record to warrant so 
finding. It cannot be presumed that 
Defendants support obligation towards 
his six children by his prior marriage 
is changed by the fact he now has two 
additional children. 
In the immediate case at hand, there was sufficient 
evidence in the record to warrant a finding of substantial 
change in circumstances with not only the two (2) additional 
children, but the other factors as referred to earlier in 
this brief. 
In the immediate case at hand the transcript of the 
hearing shows that the Respondent obtained a consolidation 
loan of $19,000.00 or a third mortgage to help make ends 
meet, or to keep his child support current due to financial 
negative cash flow. (Transcript p. 52 & 53) The Respondent 
further testified as to his basic absolute minimum expenses, 
including his three (3) teen-age daughters and his two (2) 
other children. (Transcript P. 54, 55 & 56) Respondent 
further testified that based on his income, his expenses 
including his now teen-age daughters and two additional 
children, he has a negative cash flow of $1,104.00 a month 
and has contemplated taking out bankruptcy, but further, if 
he took out bankruptcy he would lose his job because his 
employer won't let people that can't handle their financial 
affairs for other people work there and they would let him 
go. (Transcript p. 57 - 58) 
The trial Judge made specific findings in regards to 
the substantial change in circumstances which included the 
additional children and the fact that the Defendant had two 
children by this third marriage did show circumstances 
substantial enough to warrant modification of the child 
support payments. The trial Judge stated that originally at 
the time of the divorce there was the immediate emergency of 
small children and the Appellant being unable to work or 
earn normal monies and that there was a desire to in some 
way find a temporary sacrifice or something that would hold 
the family together. The Court believed that the general 
situation was now run and that the parties were in the 
position of normal divorced people, and that the emergency 
had passed. The Court found that the situation has grossly 
changed in that the income of the Appellant is greater and 
the emergency of the situation is no longer present. 
(Transcript p. 9 3 - 9 5 ) The Trial Court further found that 
the Respondent does have eight (8) children and that all new 
children have to face one thing; that is, when the new 
brothers and sisters arrive, you share with them and that 
that is the only way that the law can handle the situation. 
The Court again found that this Respondent does have eight 
(8) children and that the Court was not sure at all that 
there won't be more, and that that was part of the problem, 
and the Court did accordingly modify the child support to 
include the eight (8) children based on the evidence before 
the Court that it did constitute a substantial change in 
circumstances. 
Therefore, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion 
in considering the additional two (2) children in modifying 
and finding a substantial change in circumstances to modify 
the Decree of Divorce because sufficient evidence was before 
the Court that there was a substantial change due to the 
addition of the two (2) new children and other circum-
stances. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should find based on the standards of review 
for an Appellate Court that the trial Judge did not abuse 
his discretion in making the awards which denied additional 
compensation for an alleged irregularity in child visitation 
and which reduced the amount of child support payable by the 
Respondent to the Appellant based on a substantial change in 
circumstances concerning the parties and the children, and 
ultimately the Order of the trial Judge should be confirmed 
and the Appellant should not be awarded costs or attorney!s 
fees of this appeal. 
DATED this 16th day of November, 19 88. 
Defendant/Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /1Q? day of November, 
1988, I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing same in the 
U.S. Mail postage prepaid and addressed to the following: 
Lyle W. Hillyard 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
175 East First North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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Attorney for Defendant 
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Telephone: 621-2464 
IN TriE DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN C. DANA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
BRUCE E. DANA, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
CIVIL NO: 20582 
Tnis matter having cone on regularly for trial oefore 
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, o^ the 29th day of Decem-
ber, 19S7, or tne Plaintiff's Petition to >'odif^  tie Divorce 
Decree as to visitation and tne claiming of the three (3) 
minor children as dependents, and on the Defendant's Answer 
and Counter-Petition to reduce cnild support, a~d eacr cf 
the parties navjng been sworn and testifying m t^eir c< i 
benalf, exniojts paving been offered ard recei/cd, argument 
have been made to the Court, and the Court being fully 
cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, enters the 
following: 
re 
C T A - 1 
, A'.. 
i« KJ . t. w _; o 
O 
Z UJ 
J *r (/] J 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced on 
January 13, 1983, and at the time of the divorce there was 
hatred betv/een the parties and there is still hatred. 
2. That at the time of the divorce, there was ac\ 
emergency need for the Court to grant to the Plaintiff her 
child support and the Uniform Child Support Schedule provid-
ed that the Plaintiff when he earned approximately $3,000.00 
in the year 1983, but that the emergency has ceased in that 
the Plaintiff is employed by the United States government 
2 5 =J ? and has an annual income in excess of $17,000.00. 
3. That the Court finds that neither party acted in 
^.£5 5 good faith in that the Plaintiff is continuing her hatred of 
:
 S SI o the" Defendant and wants to be boss, and feels guilt en her 
part plus frustration in that the three (3) minor children, 
born as issue of the marriage do not have a father. 
4. That che Defendant's motive in having the trial is 
that he cannot communicate with his former wife and in order 
to reach the children he has to go through the Plaintiff for 
communications, which he cannot do. 
5. That the Court finds that this divorce . should be 
treated as an ordinary divorce; that the parties should 
pursue the culture of divorced people in a divorced v/orld. 
FIND!. tiCS Or FACT .M\I) 
C O N C ; i:sjo::r < F : .v>; 
Civil No 2050. 
6. That there has been a substantial charge o 
circumstance since the Decree in that the Plaintiff's mcorr 
has gone from $3,000.00 per year to $17,000.00 per year, an 
that the Defendant's income has gone from $21,000.00 pe 
year to $31,380.91 per year, or $2,575.00 per month, bu, 
chat: the emergency situation has terminated. 
7. That the Defendant is now obligated to suppor 
eight (8) children and since the divorce has remarried; ha 
one natural child born as issue of uhac marriage, plus ha 
adopted a child for a total of eight (8). 
5 8. That the Plaintiff receives $306.00 as and fc 
T 
T 
CD 
5 social security for the three (3) children the Defendant: i 
D 
z the father of, born prior to his marriage to this Plaintiff 
o 
o 9. That the Court finds that the Plaintiff cannc 
force the Defendant to visit if he doesn't want to. 
10. That the Defendant's present income for purpose 
of child support, wnich shall be established m accordanc 
with the Uniform Support Schedule shall be based on ti 
Defendant's monthly income of $2,575.00 plus the $306 00 h 
receives from social security for a total gross income o 
$2,881.00, and under the Uniform Child Support Schedule Lc 
eight (8) children, it is $94.00 per month. 
rJNUPJGS ( i I *"rv ^'P A - 3 
co;;c\rsu>\ ^  o» 
11. That the Uniform Support Schedule is generally set 
for the custodial parent to claim the children as dependents 
for tax purposes. 
12. That under the original Decree of Divorce, the 
Plaintiff was entitled to claim one' (1) child and the 
Defendant two (2) children born as issue of this marriage, 
and that Plaintiff has claimed all three (3) children for 
1985 and 1986, and the Defendant has claimed two (2) chil-
dren per the Decree of Divorce. 
13. That from the above and foregoing Findings of 
Fact; the Court arrives at the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That there has been a substantial change of 
circumstance since the Decree was entered, and than nhe 
Defendant shall be obligated to pay child support based or. 
eight (8) children and his gross monthly income of $2,575.00 
plus $306.00 social security he receives for his three (3) 
older daughters as a result of his first wife's demise. 
2. That commencing with the month of January, 1988, 
the child support shall be based on $2,881.00 for eight (8) 
children, or $94.00 per month per child, for a total of 
$282.00. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND A - 4 
CONCLUSIONS ON LAW 
3. That there has been a suostantial change in that 
tne Plaintiff's income has increased from $3,000 00 annual 
income in 1983 to in excess of $17,000 00 per year in 1987 
4. That the Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the 
three (3) children as dependents for income tax purposes in 
the future. 
5. That tne Court makes no order as to the years 1985 
a^d 1986, waen both parties claimed all three (3) children 
as dependents contrary to the Court Order, and lea/es it up 
to Internal Revenue Service for a determination. 
6. Tnat tne Defencant's visitation witn the minor 
cnildren snail be every other Friday, commencing witn the 
first Friday m January, 1988, from 6.00 p.m Friday to 
6 00 p.m Sunday, provided however, tnat if the Defendant is 
not going to visit tne minor children he must notify them 
three (3) days in advance that he is not coming to pick up 
the cnildren. 
7. The Defendant is entitled to have ire chilcren 
Christmas Day at 2 00 p n and keep t^e cnildren for four 
(a) additional days. 
8. Tnat the Defendant snail nave the entire rnontn o[ 
July for summer visitation, but there will be no reduction 
in child support during tne month of July 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND A - 5 
CONCLUSIONS 0^ LAU 
Civil Jo ?C58. 
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9. That Plaintiff nay have Motnei's Day, regardless 
of sno / weekend, and Defenaant to have Father's Day, regard-
less of whose weekend 
10 That if the Uniform Cnild Support Schedule cnances 
m July, 1988, then tne cnild support v/ill be cnancec to tre 
July, 1988, Schedule without: further hearing ir tris rraccer 
11. That this hearing was necessitated because of 
Plaintiff's hatred towards tne Defendant, and per cesire to 
be boss, but that: the Defendant has oenefited frc^ tne 
hearing 
12. That eacn of the parties ha/e incurrec attorney 
fees and costs and tnat eacn part:./ snould pa_/ sane 
DATED this L^ day of ^ a-w£ry , 1988 
BY T^E COURT 
/r/ 
*iO>QRA3LE J O ^ \ 7 
D i s t i n c t : Cour t Jucg 
—IQuIST 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
15' i 
LYLC W HILLYARD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LO, C n M O , 5 C J A" A-6 
PETE M. VLAHOS, §3337 
VLAHOS & SHARP 
Attorney for Defendant 
Legal Forum Building 
2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: 621-2464 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT 0? CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SUSAN C. DANA, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
BRUCE E. DANA, 
Defendant. 
ORDER MODIFYING 
DECREE OF DIVORCI 
CIVIL NO: 20532 
This matter having come en regularly for trial before 
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, on the 23th day of Decem-
ber, 1987, on the Plaintiff's Petition to Modify the Divorce 
Decree as to visitation and the claiming of the three (3) 
minor children as dependents, and on the Defendant's Answer 
and Counter-Petition to reduce child support, and each of 
the parties having been sworn and testifying in their own 
behalf, exhibits having been offered and received, argument 
have been made to the Court, and the Court being fully 
cognizant of all matters pertaining therein, and the Court 
Numb v3Q£& -C^ 
:1AY 1 9 108J 
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
A -
StT(-) S. ALLEN, Cfcrt 
1
'"••'• "n- - ^ . 0 i § ^ 
$&r\a vs . Dan 
Civil No: 20 53 2 
having made its Findings of Face and Conclusions of Lav;, 
separated stated in writing, 
NOW, THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. THat there has been a substantial change of 
circumstance since the Divorce Decree was entered on January 
13, 1983. 
2. That the Plaintiff's present income is in excess 
of $17,000.00 per year, and that the Defendant's income is 
$2,575.00 per month, plus he receives $306.00 from social 
security for the three (3) older daughters, nor. the issue of 
this marriage, from the demise of his first wife. 
3. That Defendant's child support shall be based on 
eight (8) children and a gross income of S2,38i.G0, or 
$100.00 per month per child as and for support:. 
4. That the Defendant's visitation v/ith the minor 
children1 shall be every other weekend from Friday at 6:00 
p.m. through Sunday, at 6:00 p.m., starting with the first 
Friday in I9S8, and in addition, shall have the children 
Christmas Day from 2:00 p.m. and four (4) days thereafter 
each and every year thereafter. 
5. That if the Defendant is not going to exercise his 
weekend visitation, he is to notify the children three (3) 
days prior to the scheduled visitation. 
OPDER MODIFYING DECREE 
Cf DIVORCE 
A ~ 8 
Civil No: 2058o 
6. That the Defendant shall be entitled to have the 
month of July for summer visitation, but that the child 
support shall not be abated. 
7. That each of the parties shall assume and pay 
their own attorney fees and costs in connection v/ith these 
proceedings .* 
8. That the Court makes no Order on the 1985 and 1936 
income tax return filings made by both parties wherein 
Plaintiff claimed all three (3) of the children in 1935 and 
1986, and Defendant claimed two (2) per the Court Order in 
I 
539 1985 and 1986, and leaves that up to IRS and based on the 
l<< original Decree of Divorce. 
- (Si -> 
? 2 2 9. That the Plaintiff will be entitled to claim all 
•J ^ o 
< ^  o iJ 3 o three (3) of the children in the future. 
_j 
10. That the State is anticipating a new Uniform Child 
Support Schedule to become effective in July, 1988, and if 
it becomes effective, then the child support shall be in 
ORDER MODI TYING DECREE \\-}-\ o r ^ 
OF DIVORCE A-9 *--' WJ- r ;^.~<J0 
L I V xi. isO: ^Ubu 
accordance with the new Schedule which becomes effective m 
July, 19 8 8, without further hearing. 
DATED this / (j/? day of May, 1988. 
BY T&S) COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
7bUUc> .~)&^u^_ 
!LE W. HILLYARD 
A t t o r n e y f o r P l a i n t i f J 
HJ&CP^^Z^JTOKU F . XvAFTLQuIST 
D i s t r i c t C o u r t J/xdc 
ORDER MODIFYING DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
A - 10 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
on 7 this I v day of November, I HEREBY CERTIFY that 
1988, I mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the above 
and foregoing Addendum to be included in the BRIEF OF 
RESPONDENT by placing same in the U.S. Mail postage prepaid 
and addressed to the following: 
Lyle W. Hillyard 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
175 East First North 
Logan, Utah 84321 
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